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Abstract
The proposed dissertation project contributes to the growing literature on the impact of religion
on economic outcomes. It explores the differences across religious groups with respect to
educational and occupational outcomes employing census data from Egypt, both individual-level
data (1848-1868) and village/quarter-level data (1897-1927). The digitization of the (1848-1868)
individual-level census records is currently ongoing at the National Archives of Egypt. The
empirical evidence from Egypt (1897-1927) that has been obtained to date suggests that Jews
and Copts (Egyptian Christians) outdistanced Muslims in terms of literacy and were relatively
more concentrated (than Muslims) in manufacturing and commerce. This phenomenon seems to
have deep roots in Egyptian Medieval history since at least the Islamic conquest of the thenChristian (mostly Coptic) Egypt (7th century AD). The project suggests a new interpretation of
the shift in the educational and occupational distributions of Copts after the Islamic conquest.
The theory emphasizes the role of the Islamic tax system (with its poll-tax on Non-Muslims) in
the conversion of the poor and uneducated segments of the Coptic population into Islam to avoid
paying the tax. The theory also emphasizes the geographical pattern of Arab immigration and
settlement and the role it played in explaining the subsequent spatial variation in the enforcement
of the poll-tax. It is argued that such variation in the enforcement of the poll-tax, in turn, might
have shaped the currently “observed” spatial distribution of Copts as well as the spatial variation
in the Coptic-Muslim educational and occupational differences. This hypothesis is then used to
identify the causal impact of being a Copt on literacy and occupation.

JEL Codes: N3, N75

Historical Origins of Inter-Religion Differences:
Evidence from 19th and 20th Century Egypt
I. Introduction
The proposed dissertation project explores the differences across religious groups with respect to
educational and occupational outcomes employing census data from Egypt: both individual-level
data (1848-1868) and village/quarter-level data (1897-1927). This country represents an
interesting case-study to examine the relationship between religion and human capital
accumulation. Conquered by Muslims/Arabs in the 7th century AD, the then-Christian Egypt
(with a small Jewish minority) converted slowly and gradually into a country with very
substantial Muslim majority and only a small Christian minority (currently representing about
6% of the population2). Jews represented a significant minority during the entire period until the
creation of Israel in mid- 20th century. The empirical evidence from (1897-1927), that has been
obtained to date, suggests that Jews and Copts (Egyptian Christians) outdistanced Muslims in
terms of literacy and were relatively more concentrated (than Muslims) in manufacturing and
commerce. This phenomenon seems to have deep roots in Egyptian Medieval history, at least
since the Islamic conquest of Egypt. There is strong anecdotal evidence suggesting that Copts
had a quasi-monopoly over administrative and fiscal jobs during the entire Middle Ages while
Jews were more concentrated in the financial sector. Both sets of occupations require literacy
and numeracy.
This project proposes an explanation of the Coptic transition; i.e., the shift in the educational and
occupational distributions of Copts after the Islamic conquest. In particular, we emphasize the
role of the Islamic tax system (with its poll-tax on Non-Muslims) in the conversion of the poor
and uneducated segments of the Coptic population into Islam to avoid paying the tax and the
shift of the remaining Copts into higher literacy and into the types of occupations that require
literacy. We also assert that the geographical pattern of Arab immigration and settlement also
played a role in the subsequent spatial variation in the enforcement of the poll-tax. The
hypothesis, which is explained in detail in section V, generates a prediction that can be tested
empirically against the available data. It also offers a reasonable exogenous variation in the
Copts’ rate that can be used to identify the impact of this variable on literacy and economic
occupation (See Section VI). The Jewish shift, on the other hand, can probably be explained by
the literacy requirement that was introduced under Judaism in the 1st century AD [Botticinni and
Eckstein (2002; 2005)]. If so, the source of the Jewish-Muslim differences in literacy would have
been pre Islamic conquest.

2

The number of Christians in Egypt represents a hotly-debated issue in the country. Some authors do not accept the
6% official figure, and argue that Christians represent at least 10% of the population. However, as Courbage and
Fargues [CF] (1997) pointed out, the official figures based on the censuses from 1897- 1986 show a somehow
similar percentage of Christians (between 6% and 8%), which suggests that if the Egyptian government were faking
these figures, it must have been doing so consistently for more than a century; an unlikely hypothesis given the
regime changes that Egypt went through during this long period of time. Perhaps, more importantly, CF (1997) state
that the historical vital statistics from the Registrar Central (which is an independent data source from the censuses)
show a lower birth rate for Christians than Muslims in a way that is coherent over time with the censuses’ figures.
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By gaining access to the individual-level census data from 1848 and 1868 and employing them
besides the later village/quarter- level data (1897-1927), the project should significantly
contribute to the growing literature on the impact of religion on economic outcomes. On the one
hand, there were a number of papers that introduced cross-country evidence on the impact of
religion on economic development [e.g., Barro and McCleary (2003; 2005), La Porta et al.
(1997) and Guiso et al. (2003)]. On the other hand, perhaps motivated by the limitations of the
cross-country studies, several recent papers have opted to estimate the across-religion differences
with respect to various outcomes of interest within the same country/background and to suggest
an economic rationale of such differences if any [e.g., Botticinni and Eckstein (2002; 2005);
Becker and Woessmann (2007); Boppart et al. (2008); Borooah and Iyer (2005); Chaudhary and
Rubin (2009)]. All these studies, however, have employed district-level data. The individuallevel data from mid- 19th century Egypt will thus offer a deeper insight into the determinants of
the school enrollment decision, which is, at its core, an individual- (or household-) level
decision.
We also should contribute to the understanding of the historical origins of the currently observed
differences between religious groups by resorting to the historical events that shaped the
“membership” in these religious groups. The Muslim-Coptic-Jewish gap in Egypt is not unique.
Similar gaps exist in other countries in the Middle East (as well as in other regions of the world
including the United States). In Lebanon, for instance, the gap between Maronites (Catholic
Christians) and Muslims with respect to education, occupation, and wealth is astonishing (with
Maronites having better economic outcomes) [Courbage and Fargues (1998)]. Hence, it is of
utmost importance to examine the historical roots of these phenomena.
The project requires the digitization of the aforementioned individual-level data from the period
(1848-1868). These data come from two unpublished (and undigitized) historical censuses that
were carried out in Egypt in 1848 and 1868 and that are preserved in hand-written registers at the
National Archives of Egypt (NAE). The census records include a wealth of information at the
individual-level on very important variables including sex, age, the “exact” place of residence,
origin, nationality, ethnicity, religion, school enrollment (for boys), and occupation (for males).
Also, the 1848 census represents one of the oldest censuses in the Middle East to include
information on all segments of society including females, children, and slaves. The planned data
collection involves both (1) the digitization of a random sample of the census records from 1848
and (2) the digitization of all Cairo and Alexandria census records from 1868. This will be
followed by (3) linking the individuals across the two censuses by name and location (hence
creating an individual-level panel dataset).
The importance of this data collection project stems, on the one hand, from its importance in
studying the relationship between religion, school enrollment, and occupation at a finer level of
analysis and at an earlier historical period than the village-level data from the later censuses
(1897-1927) that are currently employed in the study. This finer level of analysis will allow one
to control for a wider range of covariates; hence, making the econometric analysis far more
convincing. On the other hand, this project allows the creation of a unique historical dataset that
can be used in various fields to address a wide range of questions. Specific examples on the sort
of “economic” questions that can be addressed are discussed later in this project description
[Section VI].
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The rest of this project description is organized as follows: Section II reviews the relevant
literature on the impact of religion on economic outcomes. Section III provides the necessary
historical background on the Egyptian inter-religion differences. Section IV presents the
empirical evidence that has been obtained to date based on the village/quarter- level data (18971927). Section V discusses the proposed theoretical framework that can explain the observed
empirical evidence. Finally, section VI discusses the next steps in the project regarding (i) the
extension of the empirical analysis in order to “link” it to the theoretical framework, and (ii) the
digitization of the individual-level census data (1848-1868).
II. Literature Review
There is a growing economic literature on the relationship between religion and economic
outcomes. One line of literature has focused on the cross-country evidence. For instance, Barro
and McCleary (2003) studied the impact of church attendance and religiosity on economic
performance, to find a positive effect of the latter and a negative effect of the former. In another
study (2005), the same authors examined the determinants of having a state religion. Such
determinants include the adherence rate to the main religion, population, and GDP per capita.
Also, La Porta et al. (1997) evaluated Putnam’s premise that hierarchical organization reduces
the horizontal ties between people and hence the formation of trust using a cross-section of
countries. They found a negative association between hierarchical organization and trust. To
avoid the problems of using a single cross section, Guiso et al. (2003) used a panel of countries
from the World Values Survey in order to study the impact of religion on shaping economic
attitudes (such as trust). They find that religious beliefs are in general conducive to economic
growth with variations across religions.
Another line of literature that is more relevant to the current project studied the relationship
between religion and economic outcomes within a specific country/religion. As noted before,
Botticinni and Eckstein (2002 and 2005) argued that the literacy requirement introduced under
Judaism in the first century AD, with pure religious motives, led to a shift in the educational
distribution of Jews from illiteracy to literacy as well as a shift in their occupational distribution
from farming to the sort of urban occupations that require literacy. Becker and Woessmann
(2009) employed county-level data from late 19th century Prussia, to argue that the higher
literacy of Protestants (and not the work ethic as claimed by Max Weber) led to their better
economic performance compared to Catholics. Boppart et al. (2008) employed district-level data
from late 19th century Switzerland to evaluate the difference between Protestants and Catholics
with respect to educational outcomes. They suggested that the role of religion has to be qualified
by accounting for liberal and conservative values; such that, in more “liberal” districts the impact
of religion may be mitigated.
The aforementioned studies focused on developed countries. A few studies, however, examined
the differences across religious groups in developing countries. For example, Boorooah and Iyer
(2005) used current micro-level data from India to study the impact of religion (Muslim or
Hindu) and caste on school enrollment. They conclude that the impact of religion is mitigated
when one accounts for household characteristics. A more recent study by Chaudhary and Rubin
(2009) investigated the historical roots of the differences between Hindus and Muslims with
respect to literacy using district-level data from early 20th century India. They argued that the
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spatial variation in the institutional history might have played a role in determining the district’s
observed literacy. In particular, districts which fell under Muslim rule for many years
experienced interdependence between political and religious authorities which emphasized the
memorization of Qur’an in the schools rather than literacy. This may have resulted in lower
literacy among Muslims in these districts.
The proposed project should extend and contribute to this line of literature in several ways. First,
it explores the differences across multiple religious groups living in the same country (Muslims,
Coptic Christians, non-Coptic Christians, Jews) instead of only two groups. Second, it makes use
of individual-level data (with information on school enrollment) instead of only the
village/quarter-level data (with information on literacy) as in the previous literature. In particular,
the individual-level data will allow us to control for individual-level covariates that affect the
school enrollment decisions or literacy (which is of course an “individual” or household decision
rather than one made by the district or community as a whole). Third, it studies the inter-religion
differences at an earlier period (1848 and 1868) than the aforementioned studies, and hence is
able to track these differences in a pre-modern society in which there were few if any public
schools available and hence the educational services were mainly provided through religious
institutions. This provides a more precise measure of the impact of religion on literacy (or school
enrollment) and occupation.
III. Historical Background
At that time a Roman province, Egypt was Christianized in the period (1st – 4th century AD).
Christian Egyptians suffered persecution and suppression under the pagan Roman emperors.
Even after the Roman Empire converted to Christianity, the theological conflict on the nature of
the Christ that was raised at the Council of Chalcedon (451 AD) led to the separation of most of
Egyptian Christians from the Roman Church. These Egyptian Christians later became known as
the Copts. A small minority of the Egyptian Christians, mainly those belonging to the Hellenized
elite, chose to remain loyal to the Roman Church and became known as the Melkites. The
separation of the Copts from the Roman Church resulted in the persecution of the Copts by the
Byzantine authorities for their different doctrine, and in their being treated as heretics. Hence, on
the eve of the Islamic conquest of Egypt in 641 AD, Egypt was a Christian-Majority country
(with the “marginalized” Copts representing most of the Christians in Egypt), and with Jews
representing a small minority (mainly located in Alexandria, the urban center).
Over the centuries to follow Egypt was gradually Islamized. Unfortunately, there is no definite
answer as to when Egypt shifted from a Christian-majority to a Muslim-majority country
[Wilfong (1998)]. Two forces, however, were in action: (1) Arab immigration and settlement in
Egypt and (2) the conversion of the local population to Islam. Arabs first settled in military
barracks in the new capital, Al-Fustat (in current-day Cairo). They started to settle in the
countryside gradually in the 7th and 8th centuries, but remained a largely aristocratic ruling class.
In the 9th century, however, a royal decree resulted in depriving Arabs of the traditional military
pensions they used to receive from the Islamic state. This led to their loss of privilege against the
local population and resulted in an expansion of the numbers who settled as farmers in the
countryside [El-Barry (1992); El-Shayyal (2000)]. Arab immigration remained an important
force in the Islamization of Egypt until the non-Arab Mamluks came to power (13th century).
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Under Mamluk rule (1250-1517) and Ottoman rule (1517-1805) the flow of Arab immigration
slowed down or was even reversed with many Arabs emigrating back to the Arab peninsula, as
the non-Arab rulers discouraged Arab settlement in Egypt [El-Sherif (1965)].
Nevertheless, Arab immigration and settlement alone cannot account for the Islamization of
Egypt. The size of the immigration waves was small compared to the size of the local population
in Egypt, and historical sources emphasize the conversion of the local population to Islam as a
decisive factor in the Islamization process [e.g., Courbage and Fargues (1997); El-Shayyal
(2000)]. The conversion of Copts to Islam started right after the Islamic conquest, but no
statistics exist on the rate of conversion over the years. The best available evidence on
conversion comes from the “total receipts” of the poll-tax, which show a rapid decline in the first
two centuries after the conquest [Courbage and Fargues (1997)], hence suggesting a rapid rate of
conversion to Islam.
The occupational distribution of non-Muslims in medieval Egypt was more skewed than that of
Muslims towards the occupations that require literacy. Right after the Islamic conquest, the
conquering Arabs chose to leave the administration in the hands of the local population
[Morimoto (1981); Amer (2000)]. Moreover, they seemed to have favored the Copts over the
Melkites since the latter represented in general a Hellenized minority attached to the Byzantine
Empire [Amer (2000)]. It is interesting to observe how the historical sources agree on the
continuous role played by the Copts in public administration. There was a tradition of Copts
working in the administration as tax collectors, land surveyors, accountants, scribes, and
secretaries, a tradition that is strongly attested to by contemporary sources [Heyworth-Dunne
(1938); henceforth HD]. Although this role seems “natural” in the first years after the Islamic
conquest since Egypt was a Coptic-majority country, the continuity of this role over the centuries
until the 19th century might seem to beg explanation since Egypt at least in the later periods
became a Muslim-majority country. Jews, on the other hand, managed to remain a significant
minority during the entire period. They also held a tradition of working in the administration but
not to the same extent as the Copts. Their significant role in the financial sector and their
concentration in urban areas are well documented. They worked mainly as goldsmiths,
silversmiths, bankers and money lenders [HD (1938)].
This relative occupational concentration of non-Muslims in the jobs that require literacy seems to
have been transmitted from one generation to the next through education (which was provided by
religious institutions). Coptic schools in the Middle Ages were distinct from the Islamic ones by
their emphasis on arithmetic and geometry, besides teaching Arabic and the Bible, in order to
prepare the Coptic students to work in the administrative and fiscal sectors3. Islamic schools, on
the other hand, lacked such training. Historical evidence states that Muslim children who wanted
to work as accountants or tax collectors had to join the Coptic schools to learn these subjects
[Qasim (1977)]. It is also important to notice that Copts learned Arabic through a “secular”
3

HD (1938) mentions the following passage as the earliest account on Coptic schools written by Sadlier (1693): “…
the children were taught religion, good manners, to read and write Arabic and Coptic… and were taught geometry
and arithmetic because these two sciences are very useful and necessary on account of the overflowing of the Nile,
whereby the limits are lost; so that it becomes necessary for them to measure out their land, and by the benefit of the
first of these sciences they compute the yearly increase”. [HD (1938), pp. 85; Italics are mine to identify the words
of Sadlier (1693)].
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approach in order to use the language in their future job careers unlike Muslims who learned
Arabic mainly to memorize Quran and hence did not emphasize literacy per se. This might
suggest that literacy might have been more emphasized in Coptic schools than in Muslim ones.
In comparison, little evidence exists on the curriculum of Jewish schools. It seems that the
curriculum was generally religious in nature (like the Coptic and Islamic schools) [Qasim
(1977)], but also contained practical elements to prepare the Jewish children for their future
careers in the financial sector [HD (1938)].
Education continued to be provided solely by the religious institutions (these schools were
known as kuttabs) until the 19th century. When Muhammad Ali (1805-1849) came to power in
Egypt, he introduced modern European-style educational institutions but these were accessible to
only a very small percentage of the population and hence did not manage to replace the religious
education system. Moreover, such modern schools were providing “higher” education, while the
elementary education continued to be supplied by the Kuttabs. On the other hand, starting from
the mid- 19th century European missionaries began to introduce a significant number of
European-style schools that became increasingly popular especially among the non-Muslim
elites. However, the kuttab system remained in wide use until mid- 20th century.
IV. Empirical Evidence
At present, the empirical evidence I am able to offer is based on the village/quarter-level data
from the published Egyptian census reports (1882-1996) that were digitized by a French center in
Egypt, Centre d’Etudes et de Documentation Economiques, Juridiques, et Sociales [CEDEJ
(2003)]. The next step of the project will employ individual-level data from (1848-1868).
Religion and literacy were recorded in these reports for the sub-period (1897-1986). The specific
data collected differed from one census year to another on an ad hoc basis. I focus on the early
censuses (1897-1927) since it would seem likely that inter-religion differences would be likely to
decrease after public education had become widespread. Hence, to examine the possible role of
religion on literacy, it is advantageous to concentrate on the “pre-modern” period and premodern society. Compared to the aforementioned studies, Egypt in this period was a “premodern” society where religious institutions still played a large and almost exclusive role in
education, and only around 5% (of total population) was literate.
These censuses were checked for internal consistency before being used in my analysis and
minor data cleaning was involved. From the summary statistics shown in table (1), one can
observe the relative concentration of Copts4 in Middle Upper Egypt. Their relative concentration
decreases if one goes to Northern Upper Egypt or Southern Upper Egypt. It decreases even
further in Lower Egypt (in the north). In Urban Provinces (Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez Canal
provinces), although the Christians’ rate is relatively high, most of these Christians are nonCopts. Jews, on the other hand, are an “urbanized” group, mostly concentrated in the urban
4

Christians in Egypt represent a heterogeneous group. Copts (ethnically- Egyptian Christians) are the large majority.
Copts are further sub- divided into Orthodox (which is different from the Greek Orthodox Church), Catholic, and
Protestant sects. Among these Coptic sects, the Orthodox Copts are the majority. Beside Copts, there are non-Coptic
sects (Greek Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, and Oriental Christian Churches) who are basically either direct
immigrants or descendants of foreign immigrants [CEDEJ (2003); Atiya (2005)].
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provinces. As for average male literacy rate, it is highest in urban provinces followed by Lower
Egypt, and then by Upper Egypt. Therefore, it seems that average literacy decreases as one goes
south in the country (up the Nile). Similar patterns exist for average male employment rate and
the average percentage of males working in manufacturing and commerce.
Table (2) shows the summary statistics for the key variables by year. The religious composition
of the population of Egypt seems to have been stable over the period 1897-1927. There was,
however, some increase in the male literacy rate over the period [See Figures 1-2].
The basic empirical strategy I employed at this stage is to treat the religious composition at the
village/quarter level as exogenous and examine its impact (by OLS) on two main outcomes of
interest: literacy and (male) occupational distribution (as measured by the male employment rate
and the percentage of males working in manufacturing and commerce). In these regressions, the
censuses are pooled, with both year dummies and year dummies interacted with each of the
regressors included in the specification. Controls include log (population), the percent female,
and population per housing unit (as a measure of density). In some years I am able to control for
the percentage of people under 10 years old, the percentage of blind people, and the percentage
of foreigners. In occupational distribution regressions (which are only possible in the case of the
1927 census), I also control for the percentage of people who are 60 years old and above.
In particular, the relationship between religion and the literacy rate is examined by two sets of
regressions: First, pooled OLS regression of literacy rate on religious composition at the village/
quarter level; and second, pooled OLS regressions for male and female literacy rates separately.
As a further check, the villages/quarters are matched across censuses based on their 1996
mapping, and a panel dataset is constructed. For those villages/quarters that do not have a
mapping in 1996, they were matched across the censuses (1897-1927) by name, district, and
province. Fixed Effects and Random Effects estimates are employed, in which variation is
attributable to changes in religious composition in the same village/quarter over time.
On the other hand, the relationship between religion, employment and occupational distribution
is examined by OLS using the cross-sectional data from the 1927 census, the first census to
include information on occupational distribution at the village/quarter level. The dependent
variables of interest are the percentage of males with occupation and the percent of males
working in manufacturing and commerce.
The main results are shown in Tables (3) - (7). Table (3) shows the Pooled OLS regression of
literacy rate on religious composition. The different regressions stem from the fact that there are
different “religious groups” identified in each census. Control variables include percent female,
log (population), and population per housing unit5. For each regression, the first column
represents the regression without provincial fixed effects, while the second one controls for
these. Hence, if one wants to use the entire period (1897-1927), the only available measure is
“Non-Muslims’ Rate”. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant. By limiting the
number of censuses employed in the analysis one can break down this measure further. For
5

As a robustness check, other controls such as the percentage of population under 10 years old, the percentage of
foreigners, and the percentage of blind people were also tried where available without a qualitative change in the
results.
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example, the coefficient on Christians’ rate is positive and significant in the pooled censuses
(1897, 1907, and 1917). Jews’ rate has a much stronger impact but is less precisely estimated,
probably because of the much stronger spatial concentration of Jews in urban provinces (i.e. the
little variation of the Jews’ rate across villages/quarters), unlike Christians who are relatively
evenly distributed over the entire country. Finally, the coefficient on the Copts’ rate (1897, 1907,
and 1927) is positive but much smaller in magnitude than that of the Christians’ rate. When I
break down Christians into Copts and Non-Coptic Christians in 1897 and 1907, the effect of the
latter seems to be much stronger.
The same analysis was repeated for the male literacy rate and female literacy rate separately
[Tables (4) and (5)]. As one may expect, the effects are found to be much stronger for males than
for females. The Copts’ rate, for example, seems to have no significant impact on the female
literacy rate.
The panel estimation results from both Fixed Effects and Random Effects models are shown in
Table (6). Overall, RE estimates seem to be comparable in magnitude to those from Pooled OLS,
but the FE estimates are in general larger. The larger standard errors of the FE estimates
(compared to the RE estimates) are due to the fact that there is relatively little variation in the
religious composition over time.
Hence, it seems that non-Muslim minorities enjoyed higher literacy rates compared to Muslims.
Table (7) shows the OLS estimates of the relationship between male employment rate (and the
percentage of males working in manufacturing and commerce) and religious composition. This
analysis is based on the 1927 census which is the first census to have such information available
at the village/ quarter level6. The relationship between the Copts’ rate and male employment rate
is negative but switches sign once provincial fixed effects are controlled for. Its relationship with
the percentage of males working in manufacturing and commerce is positive and significant with
and without provincial fixed effects. The coefficient on the percentage of other religions (which
include Jews) shows a much stronger relationship.
V. Theoretical Framework: An Interpretation of Coptic Economic History
The aforementioned empirical evidence suggests that Christians and Jews outdistanced Muslims
with respect to literacy and were relatively more concentrated in manufacturing and commercial
occupations. My theoretical framework is developed to explain the Coptic-Muslim gap. On the
one hand, as mentioned before, the Jewish-Muslim gap can be probably explained by the literacy
requirement introduced under Judaism in the first century AD. On the other hand, the gap
between non-Coptic Christians and Muslims in Egypt may be due to the different backgrounds of
the two groups. Non-Coptic Christians in Egypt were mainly immigrants or descendants of
“recent” immigrants to Egypt and hence may be affected by a different historical background
from that of Egyptian Muslims. Thus, the focus on the Coptic-Muslim gap can be defended on
the grounds that both Muslims and Copts in Egypt were subject to the same background during
most of the middle ages, and so the observed gap can be more informative in the sense that it is a
more “controlled” experiment, with the historical backgrounds of both groups held constant. It
6

Previous censuses’ reports have such information available at the district level.

9

also should be noted that Copts represent the vast majority of the non-Muslims in Egypt [Table
(2)].
Unlike Jewish or Protestant economic histories, Coptic economic history seems to be void of
literacy requirement reforms. Instead, I believe that the observed Coptic-Muslim gap can be
explained by returning to the historical events that shaped the “membership” in these two groups
in Egypt. In general, my hypothesis argues that the Islamic tax system with its poll-tax (gizya) on
non-Muslims generated an incentive to convert to Islam that was especially strong for the
poorer/uneducated segments of the Coptic society. This pattern of conversion to Islam among the
Copts led to the creation of a more “bourgeois” Coptic population that is on average better
educated and more concentrated in the occupations that require literacy than the Copts who
converted to Islam. The little mobility in medieval societies with the hereditary nature of most of
the occupations may have resulted in the persistence of this gap over time.
As such this theory doesn’t make any statement about the geographic variation in the observed
Coptic presence in Egypt. As previously mentioned, Copts seem to be concentrated in Middle
Upper Egypt. To explain the observed pattern, it is argued that the spatial variation in Arab
immigration and settlement in Egypt which started with the Islamic conquest (7th century AD)
led to a change in the structure of land tenure and the composition of the rural local elites at the
village-level. While in Lower Egypt (in the north) Coptic rural elites lost their power to the Arab
landlords, they managed to retain their authority in many villages in Upper Egypt (in the south)
due to the less immigration of Arabs there. This spatial variation in the composition of the
village headmen might have led to a spatial variation in the enforcement of the “decentralized”
poll-tax. Under the decentralized tax collection system that was adopted in Egypt during most of
the Middle Ages the village headmen and local elites were responsible for collecting the tax from
their fellowmen. In Lower Egypt, Arab headmen were more likely to enforce the poll-tax on
Coptic taxpayers leading to more conversion of the poor/uneducated segments of the society. In
contrast, Coptic headmen in Upper Egypt may have colluded with their fellow Copts in the face
of the central Arab government to avoid taxes leading to less conversion of the poor/uneducated.
To sum up, in a bipolar world of wealthy educated administrators and poor uneducated farmers,
the farmers were more likely to convert to avoid paying the poll-tax. This “selection” was more
likely to be severe in Lower Egypt (as compared to Upper Egypt) due to the aforementioned
mechanism.
Historical facts seem to be consistent with this hypothesis. The poll-tax seems to have been an
important factor in the Islamization of Egypt. Contemporary Coptic sources stress the role of the
poll-tax (gizya) imposed on non-Muslims in inducing the Copts to convert to Islam at least in the
initial period [Severus Ibn-Al-Muqqafa’ (11th Century): cited in Amer (2000) and El-Shayyal
(2000)]. The suppression of the Coptic tax revolts in the 8th and early 9th centuries also resulted
in large waves of conversion. Forced conversion, on the other hand, seems to have been very
limited. Two notes are in order: First, the poll-tax seems to have been a significant burden. From
the papyri tax registers that survived from the early medieval period in Egypt, one can see that
the average poll-tax was around two dinars [Morimoto (1981)], which is comparable to the
monthly salary of an artisan [Ashtor (1969)]. Also, the Cairo Geniza documents have preserved
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many letters from poor Jews asking for help to pay the poll-tax7 [Alshech (2003)]. Second,
historical evidence suggests that there were also differences in the amount of land tax between
Muslims and non-Muslims in Egypt (in specific periods), and hence this may have constituted an
additional incentive to convert to Islam [Morimoto (1981)].
The tax collection system in medieval Egypt passed through several stages [Morimoto (1981)].
Upon the conquest, the system was decentralized with the village headmen holding a great power
in the estimation of the taxes and the preparation of the lists of the taxpayers in their villages. In
the 8th century, there were several attempts to centralize the system and strengthen the hold of the
central government tax collectors on the tax preparation and estimation procedures. These
attempts seem to have been the factor that led to several tax revolts during that century. It is
interesting here to notice that such revolts did not occur in the decentralized period hence
suggesting that there might have been collusion between the tax collectors and the taxpayers in
that early period. After these tax revolts, the government adopted the decentralized tax
contracting system under which there was bidding for the tax contract for every region. Those
who won the bid were responsible for paying the tax amount to the central government in
advance before collecting the tax from the taxpayers. This system remained in practice during
most of the Middle Ages until Muhammad Ali came to power in the 19th century.
Hence, it seems that the village headmen and the rural local elites played a significant role in
collecting taxes over the entire period; be it a poll-tax or a land-tax. Collusion between Coptic
rural elites and their fellow Coptic farmers seems to have been taking place. The problem of the
“fugitives”; i.e. those who fled from their home villages to avoid paying the tax is well-known,
and such phenomenon remained in existence until the 19th century [Dennett (1950); Egyptian
19th Century Census Registers]. Village headmen could have easily facilitated the fleeing of
these farmers. Also, tax arrears were not uncommon, and the headmen might have played a role
in this phenomenon [Morimoto (1981)]. Finally, documents from the Cairo Geniza suggest that
wealthy Jews were helping the poor Jews to pay the tax installments [Alshech (2003)]. Similar
cooperation may well have existed within the Coptic community.
Finally, An important assumption in the theoretical framework has to do with the hereditary
nature of the educational and occupational outcomes. Historical accounts seem to support this
assumption. As Heyworth-Dunne (1938) pointed out, the curriculum in the Coptic schools
“provided the students with a special training that would enable them to follow up with
apprenticeship to one of those trades or professions allotted to the Copts by tradition”. A similar
account is made on the Jews.
VI. The Next Steps on Extending the Empirical Analysis
1. Linking the Empirical Analysis to the Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework described in the previous section seems to have some support from
the village-level empirical evidence (1897-1927). In particular, in order to test the validity of the
7

Although many Islamic sources mention that the “poor” were exempted from the poll-tax, it seems that the
definition of the poor included only those who didn’t have an occupation and hence lived on charity [Alshech
(2003)].
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prediction of the theoretical framework, a comparison is made between the Coptic-Muslim gaps
with respect to male literacy rate, and the percentage of males working in manufacturing and
commerce in the different regions of Egypt (Urban provinces, Lower Egypt, Northern Upper
Egypt, Middle Upper Egypt, Southern Upper Egypt, and Border provinces) [See Table (8)]. As
expected from the theoretical framework, the gap seems to be relatively smaller in Middle Upper
Egypt where less conversion to Islam among the poor/uneducated Copts took place historically.
The empirical evidence presented so far has treated religion (in particular, village-level religious
composition) as exogenous. Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that this assumption might
be violated. In particular, there might have been a "two-way" relationship between religion (or
village-level religious composition) and education/occupation. In so far as the 19th/20th century
generation's education/occupation/religion would reflect ancestors' social status and religion, it
could be the case that those ancestors chose their religion (whether to remain a Copt or to
convert to Islam) based on their social status (as reflected in their educational level and
occupation besides other factors). If so, the effect could well have been going the other way (i.e.
from education/occupation to religion instead of from religion to education and occupation) at
the time when religious conversions took place. Assuming very little social mobility in the
medieval society, the choice of religion may have been transmitted from one generation to
another along with the dynasty's social status. Thus, an OLS regression of the later generation's
education/occupation on religion might be mistaken in treating the religion as an exogenous
variable.
Therefore, the next step of the empirical strategy treats the “Christian Coptic” religion (whether
measured at the individual-level in 1848-1868 or at the village/quarter level in 1897-1927) as
endogenous. In order to identify the impact of religion on literacy or occupation one needs to
find an exogenous variation in Copts’ rate. The theoretical framework described previously
suggests that the pattern of Arab immigration and settlement can be used as an instrumental
variable to explain the spatial distribution of Copts. But can the pattern of Arab immigration
explain the currently observed pattern of Coptic presence across the different regions of Egypt?
While Arabs may have penetrated every region in Egypt, the extent of this penetration seems to
vary from one region to another. Early Arab immigration was concentrated in Lower Egypt and
Northern Upper Egypt since these were closer to the capital (Al-Fustat where the military
barracks were) [El-Barry (1992)]. Over the first three centuries after the Islamic conquest (7th-9th
centuries), when most of the immigration waves took place, Arab tribes started to penetrate
Southern Upper Egypt to make use of the gold mines there, to benefit from its proximity to the
Arab peninsula through the trade route that crosses the desert to the Red Sea, and to participate in
defending the Southern borders against the then-Christian and independent Nubian kingdom in
the far south [El-Sherif (1965), El-Barry (1992)]. However, the fact that Middle Upper Egypt
received several waves of Arab immigration as well suggests that measuring the variation in
Arab immigration at the “regional” level might be too aggregated to explain the observed spatial
distribution of Copts, which seems to vary much “within” the regions. Thus, more suitable and
“finer” measures of the pattern of Arab immigration have to be used in order to find a strong
explanatory power of this instrument on the Copts’ rate in the first stage. In other words, what is
needed is a measure of Arab immigration at the “village” level. One candidate measure- that we
are currently investigating- is the “village name”. The rationale for this is that many villages are
named after specific Arab tribes and/or may contain words of Bedouin origin. Such villages are
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more likely to have received Arab immigration waves than villages with different non-Arab or
non-tribal names [Woidich (1996)]. This part of the project is still ongoing.
Another approach to deal with the possible endogeneity of the Coptic religion is to make use of
the panel structure of the data; be it the village/quarter- level panel dataset 1897-1927 or the
proposed individual-level panel dataset 1848-1868 that will be constructed once the digitization
of 1848 and 1868 census records takes place. Such panel structure allows one to control for the
unobservable characteristics that may be correlated with religion. Making use of the panel
dataset at the village/quarter-level that is available at present is currently ongoing.
2. Digitizing Historical Individual-Level Census Records from Egypt (1848-1868)
The next and already started stage of the project attempts to employ Egyptian individual-level
data from two unpublished historical censuses that were carried out in 1848 and 1868. This is
extremely important for three reasons:
First, extending the analysis to the individual-level data may be far more informative since it
allows one to control for the household background (e.g. father’s occupation, type of dwelling,
fiscal status of dwelling, and number of servants and slaves owned by the household) when
studying the impact of the father’s religion on the son’s school enrollment and the son’s
occupation. This would represent quite an advance over the existing literature on religion and
economic outcomes that has relied on highly aggregated levels of analysis.
Second, turning the analysis to a period earlier than the late 19th century may be really beneficial
since by the late 19th century Egypt, European missionary schools were widespread in Egypt.
Hence the higher literacy outcomes observed for non-Muslims may merely reflect their higher
enrollment in these schools as compared to Muslims. By going to an earlier period when there
were very few missionary schools and very few secular public schools available so that the
religious institutions (mosques, churches, or synagogues) were almost exclusively the ones
responsible for providing education, one would be far more perfectly able to identify the role
played by religion in shaping economic outcomes.
Third, and what in the long run will be the most important reason, when digitized this data will
be available for scholars around the world to make use of for examining any number of issues in
which they might be interested8. For example, historians specializing in the Middle East will
benefit a lot from this dataset in understanding the real living conditions of the people in this
period. Demographers will be able to compare the demographic conditions in 19th century Egypt
to other countries and regions of the world. Examples for the research questions in economics
are: the inter-religion differences with respect to fertility (as measured by the number of children
living in the household at the time of the census) and the impact of polygamy on fertility, the
long-term impact of slavery on economic development (before and after slavery was banned in
Egypt in 1877), the causes and consequences of internal migration, the structure of the Waqf
system and its possible consequences, and the impact of Muhammad Ali’s policies in the fields
of education, industrialization, and military conscription on living conditions of Individuals.
8

An agreement between the National Archives of Egypt and IPUMS-International is currently being negotiated in
order to disseminate the digitized 1848 and 1868 data on the IPUMS website within a year after my graduation.
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The 1848 and 1868 census records are preserved in the National Archives of Egypt (NAE). They
were discovered and organized in mid- to late 1990s but newly discovered registers were added
to the shelves as recent as 2005. The censuses include a number of interesting variables such as
name (missing for many females), sex, age (except for females in Cairo and Alexandria),
location (for Cairo and Alexandria including detailed address within the city), nationality,
religion, household relationships, origin (not exactly place of birth), legal status (free or slave),
detailed economic occupation (missing for most females), school enrollment for boys of school
age, and type and ownership of dwelling (both only for dwellings in Cairo and Alexandria).
Besides, the censuses also include non-systematic recording of other variables such as polygamy,
marital status (for widowed and divorced women), infirmities, internal migration, and physical
description (height and facial description). It also should be noted that the 1848 census is one of
the earliest censuses in the Ottoman Empire to include information on women, children, and
slaves [Cuno and Reimer (1997)]. The earliest “equivalent” census in Istanbul took place in
1881.
This crucial phase of the project consists of the following phases:
1. Phase (1): Digitizing a 1 percent sample of 1848 census records. The sampling rate is 5
percent in Cairo and Alexandria. The targeted sample size is 60,000. This phase was
approved by the NAE administration in late June 2009 and the actual digitization started
in August 2009, is currently ongoing, and is expected to be completed by the end of Fall
2009. A similar project was carried out by Centre d’Etudes et de Documentation
Economiques, Juridiques, et Sociales “CEDEJ” in 1995-1998 and is described in
Alleaume and Fargues (1998) and in Fargues (2003) but their project was never
completed and other than some results obtained from a small Cairo sample, neither has
the data been made available nor has anything been published.
2. Phase (2): Digitizing all the records from Cairo and Alexandria from 1868 partial census.
This phase is expected to take place in 2010.
3. Phase (3): Link the individual records across the two censuses by location, name, and
household relationship in order to create a panel dataset. Previous preliminary (manual)
work has been done in this direction by some of the researchers at NAE and proved to be
successful.
As indicated above, the potential benefits of the census digitization project extend well beyond
their use in testing the hypotheses I have posed in this project. The data provided will be
available to others to describe changes of the critical Muhammad Ali and subsequent periods in
Egypt’s history and to help answer a wide range of research questions, examples of which were
given above. Having a panel dataset is especially intriguing for this will probably be one of the
oldest individual-level panel dataset available from any pre-industrial society.
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Table (1): Summary Statistics by Region
Variable
Non-Muslims’ Rate

Christians’ Rate

Copts’ Rate

Jews’ Rate

Male Literacy Rate

Male Employment
Rate

% Males in
Manufacturing and
Commerce

Region
Urban Provinces
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt- North
Upper Egypt- Middle
Upper Egypt- South
Urban Provinces
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt- North
Upper Egypt- Middle
Upper Egypt- South
Urban Provinces
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt- North
Upper Egypt- Middle
Upper Egypt- South
Urban Provinces
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt- North
Upper Egypt- Middle
Upper Egypt- South
Urban Provinces
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt- North
Upper Egypt- Middle
Upper Egypt- South
Urban Provinces
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt- North
Upper Egypt- Middle
Upper Egypt- South
Urban Provinces
Lower Egypt
Upper Egypt- North
Upper Egypt- Middle
Upper Egypt- South

N
1229
8606
1744
3166
884
913
6482
1303
2383
664
917
6510
1317
2397
664
913
6482
1303
2383
664
1229
8606
1744
3166
884
678
4378
876
1574
449
316
2124
441
783
220
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Mean
0.199
0.024
0.043
0.174
0.045
0.166
0.024
0.043
0.174
0.043
0.042
0.022
0.042
0.173
0.043
0.029
0.0002
0.0002
0.0001
0.0001
0.294
0.104
0.090
0.071
0.072
0.720
0.692
0.660
0.639
0.643
0.355
0.061
0.082
0.056
0.063

St. Deviation
0.256
0.087
0.099
0.2
0.073
0.228
0.089
0.102
0.2
0.071
0.087
0.089
0.101
0.201
0.071
0.098
0.003
0.003
0.0004
0.0005
0.174
0.069
0.072
0.055
0.068
0.135
0.086
0.11
0.094
0.125
0.124
0.068
0.093
0.065
0.079

Min.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.049
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max.
1
0.96
1
1
0.664
1
0.96
1
1
0.664
0.909
0.96
1
1
0.664
0.99
0.117
0.091
0.011
0.005
1
0.857
0.655
0.579
0.471
1
1
0.964
1
1
0.626
0.514
0.47
0.399
0.501

Variable
Non-Muslims’ Rate

Christians’ Rate

Copts’ Rate

Jews’ Rate

Male Literacy Rate

Male Employment Rate
% Males in Manufacturing and
Commerce

Table (2): Summary Statistics by Year
Year
N
Mean
St. Deviation
1897
4075
0.072
0.162
1907
3854
0.068
0.148
1917
3872
0.074
0.153
1927
3980
0.071
0.150
1897
4075
0.070
0.159
1907
3854
0.065
0.143
1917
3872
0.070
0.144
1897
4075
0.058
0.141
1907
3854
0.057
0.132
1927
3980
0.058
0.128
1897
4075
0.002
0.022
1907
3854
0.002
0.028
1917
3872
0.003
0.034
1897
4075
0.079
0.085
1907
3854
0.081
0.072
1917
3872
0.105
0.088
1927
3980
0.172
0.113
1897
4075
0.649
0.121
1927
3980
0.708
0.068
1927

3980

0.087

Min.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.191

Max.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.997
0.882
0.990
0.911
1
0.722
1
1
1
1

0

0.977

0.115

Figure (1): The Evolution of Non-Muslims' Rate in Egypt (1897-1986)
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Figure (2): Illiteracy Rate (% of Total Population) (Children under schooling
age are counted as illiterate) (1897-1996)
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Table (3): Religion and Literacy (Pooled OLS)
[Dependent variable: Literacy rate (% of total population)]
1897-1927

Non-Muslims’ rate

(1)
.168
(.027)

(2)
.168
(.025)

Christians’ rate

1897, 1907, and
1917
(1)
(2)

.158
(.032)

1897, 1907,
and 1927
(1)
(2)

.038
(.009)

.074
(.006)

Non-Coptic Christians’’ rate

Other religions’ rate (excluding
Muslims and Copts)
Provinces’ Dummies?
N
R-squared

.507
(.281)

No
15724
0.348

Yes
15724
0.611

No
11749
0.343

(1)

(2)

0.038
(0.009)

0.060
(0.007)

0.708
(0.031)

0.669
(0.040)

0.205
(0.058)

0.094
(0.032)

No
7897
0.737

Yes
7897
0.797

.161
(.027)

Copts’ rate

Jews’ rate

1897 and 1907

.23
(.15)

Yes
11749
0.584

.641
(.046)
No
11872
0.671

.556
(.061)
Yes
11872
0.753

Robust standard errors (clustered at the district level) are in parentheses. Control variables in each regression are:
females’ rate, log (population), population per housing unit (as a measure of density). Year dummies and
interactions of each regressor with year dummies are included in each regression.
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Table (4): Religion and Literacy for Males (Pooled OLS)
[Dependent variable: Male Literacy rate (% of total male population)]
1897-1927

Non-Muslims’ rate

(1)
0.206
(0.034)

1897, 1907, and
1917
(1)
(2)

(2)
0.216
(0.024)

Christians’ rate

0.194
(0.034)

Non-Coptic Christians’ rate

Other religions’ rate (excluding
Muslims and Copts)
Provinces’ Dummies?
N
R-squared

No
15724
0.320

Yes
15724
0.586

1897 and 1907
(1)

(2)

0.208
(0.025)

Copts’ rate

Jews’ rate

1897, 1907, and
1927
(1)
(2)

0.614
(0.295)

0.232
(0.127)

No
11749
0.266

Yes
11749
0.539

0.077
0.140
0.076
0.122
(0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013)
0.734
0.633
(0.034) (0.050)
0.318
0.121
(0.080) (0.037)
0.679
0.528
(0.041) (0.060)
No
Yes
No
Yes
11872 11872
7897
7897
0.533
0.657
0.514
0.639

Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Control variables in each regression are:
females’ rate, log (population), population per housing unit (as a measure of density). Year dummies and
interactions of each regressor with year dummies are included in each regression.

Table (5): Religion and Literacy for Females (Pooled OLS)
[Dependent variable: Female Literacy rate (% of total female population)]
1897-1927

Non-Muslims’ rate

(1)
0.107
(0.031)

(2)
0.102
(0.025)

Christians’ rate

1897, 1907, and
1917
(1)
(2)

1897, 1907, and
1927
(1)
(2)

(1)

(2)

0.100
0.095
(0.030) (0.025)

Copts’ rate

0.001
(0.001)

0.008
(0.002)

0.556
(0.058)
No
11850
0.763

0.531
(0.065)
Yes
11850
0.795

Non-Coptic Christians’ rate
Jews’ rate
Other religions’ rate (excluding
Muslims and Copts)
Provinces’ Dummies?
N
R-squared

1897 and 1907

0.371
0.235
(0.270) (0.187)

No
15701
0.256

Yes
15701
0.502

No
11737
0.284

Yes
11737
0.462

0.001
-0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
0.636
0.654
(0.042) (0.041)
0.097
0.082
(0.053) (0.049)

No
7886
0.860

Yes
7886
0.863

Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Control variables in each regression are:
females’ rate, log (population), population per housing unit (as a measure of density). Year dummies and
interactions of each regressor with year dummies are included in each regression.
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Table (6): Religion and Literacy (FE and RE)
[Dependent variable: Literacy rate (% of total population)]
1897-1927
FE
RE
0.281
0.271
(0.010) (0.006)

Non-Muslims’ rate

1897, 1907, and 1897, 1907, and 1897 and 1907
1917
1927
FE
RE
FE
RE
FE
RE

Christians’ rate

0.274
0.226
(0.008) (0.005)

Copts’ rate

0.176
0.043
0.125
(0.014) (0.006) (0.010)
0.639
(0.020)
0.318
0.487
0.333
(0.029) (0.021)
(0.039)
0.535
0.718
(0.023) (0.009)
11254 11254 11354 11354 7597
0.215
0.171
0.376
0.150
0.296
0.186
0.351
0.058
0.678
0.666

Non-Coptic Christians’ rate
Jews’ rate
Other religions’ rate (excluding
Muslims and Copts)
N
15011
Within R-squared
0.256
Between R-Squared
0.025

15011
0.154
0.246

0.036
(0.003)
0.732
(0.007)
0.256
(0.016)

7597
0.259
0.811

Standard errors are in parentheses. Control variables in each regression are: females’ rate, log (population), and
population per housing unit (as a measure of density).

Table (7): Employment, Occupational Distribution, and Religion for
Males in 1927
Dependent
Male Copts’ rate
Male other
religions’ rate
(excluding
Muslims and
Copts)
Provinces’
Dummies?
N
R-Squared

% Males with Occupation
(1)
(2)
-0.064
0.016
(0.012)
(0.009)
0.146
0.087
(0.042)
(0.024)

% Males in Manufacturing and Commerce
(1)
(2)
0.063
0.097
(0.019)
(0.016)
0.221
0.071
(0.145)
(0.105)

No

Yes

No

Yes

3975
0.45

3975
0.598

3975
0.36

3975
0.617

Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Control variables are: log (population),
population per housing unit (as a measure of density), male foreigners’ rate, % of males under 10 years old, % of
males 60 years old and above, and % of blind males. All the variables are percentages of the male population.
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Table (8): Relationship between Literacy, Occupation, and Religion for Males in Upper Egypt,
Lower Egypt, and Urban Provinces (Pooled OLS)
Dependent

Copts’ Rate
N
R-Squared
Dependent

Copts’ Rate

N
R-Squared

A. Male Literacy Rate (1897, 1907, and 1927)
Urban
Provinces

Lower
Egypt

0.212
(0.088)
894
0.644

0.185
(0.020)
6502
0.510

Northern
Upper
Egypt
0.203
(0.027)
1317
0.558

Middle
Upper
Egypt
0.078
(0.011)
2396
0.456

Southern
Upper
Egypt
0.177
(0.024)
660
0.594

B. % Males in Manufacturing and Commerce (1927)
Urban
Lower
Northern
Middle
Southern
Provinces
Egypt
Upper
Upper
Upper
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
-0.166
0.110
0.204
0.054
0.562
(0.067)
(0.022)
(0.101)
(0.007)
(0.095)
312
0.238

2123
0.378

441
0.243

783
0.327

220
0.586

Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district level). Each column represents a separate
regression. Controls for literacy regression are females’ rate, log (population), population per housing unit, year
dummies, and interactions of each of these variables with year dummies. Controls for occupational distribution
regression are log population, population per housing unit, foreigners’ rate, % of population under 10 years old, %
of population 60 years and above, and % of blind people. Regressions for border provinces are not shown to save
space.
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